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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  
      yberspace is considered by many to be a new warfighting domain.1 Le-
gal discussions concerning warfare in this domain have primarily focused 
on the level of the ius ad bellum2 and international armed conflicts.3 With the 
exception of action on cybercrime, especially the 2001 European Conven-
tion on Cybercrime and tentative attempts to design a similar instrument 
                                                                                                                      
* Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany. 
1. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 37 
(2010) [hereinafter QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT]. 
2. Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 
2(4), 36 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (2011); HEATHER H. DINNISS, 
CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 37 (2012); Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cy-
berspace, 52 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 373 (2011); Marco Roscini, World 
Wide Warfare: Jus ad Bellum and the Use of Cyber Force, 14 MAX PLANCK UNITED NATIONS 
YEARBOOK 85 (2010). 
3. Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello, 84 IN-
TERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 365 (2002); Sean Watts, Combatant Status and 
Computer Network Attack, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392 (2010). 
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on the global level,4 the focus of contemporary discussions has primarily 
been on inter-State issues and State-sponsored cyber operations. Converse-
ly, the relevance of cyber warfare in non-international armed conflicts and 
the corresponding legal challenges arising under the laws of armed conflict 
have only rarely been addressed.5  
One reason is certainly the notion that non-international armed conflict 
today encompasses such a wide range of rather different scenarios,6 ranging 
from low-intensity armed conflicts between organized armed groups in 
failed-State scenarios like Somalia7 to traditional types of civil war like the 
ongoing armed conflict in Syria to “internationalized” scenarios like the 
armed conflict in Afghanistan,8 that the relevance of cyber warfare in a par-
ticular conflict varies widely. Quite clearly, in many non-international 
armed conflict scenarios sophisticated cyber weaponry is without signifi-
cant military relevance. Nevertheless, when parties to a non-international 
armed conflict rely on cyber infrastructure and cyber operations to further 
their strategic aims, cyber operations will also become increasingly relevant. 
The Syrian government, for example, has repeatedly shut off the Internet 
                                                                                                                      
4. Marco Gercke, Ten Years [after the] Convention on Cybercrime: Achievements and Failures of 
the Council of Europe’s Instrument in the Fight against Internet-Related Crimes, 12 COMPUTER LAW 
REVIEW INTERNATIONAL 142 (2011); UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME 218 (2010) [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME]; 
Susan W. Brenner, Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism and Cyberwarfare, 77 REVUE INTERNATIONALE 
DE DROIT PENALE 454 (2006). 
5. Rather the focus has been on potential terrorist attacks by non-State actors. See, e.g., 
Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using 
Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 59 
(2010).  
6. Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Con-
cepts and Actual Situations, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 75 (2009); 
Marko Milanovic & Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW (Nigel D. White & 
Christian Henderson eds., forthcoming 2013); SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2012). 
7. Robin Geiss, Armed Violence in Fragile States: Low-intensity Conflicts, Spillover Conflicts, 
and Sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by Third Parties, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE 
RED CROSS 134 (2009). 
8. Robin Geiss & Michael Siegrist, Has the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan Affected the Rules 
on the Conduct of Hostilities?, 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 11, 13–14 
(2011). 
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to block opposition groups’ channels of communication,9 U.S. drones have 
reportedly been hacked by Iraqi insurgents,10 and websites used by Al-
Qaida have repeatedly been hacked and manipulated by the U.S. Depart-
ment of State,11 although it remains, of course, controversial as to whether 
the latter activities have occurred in the context of a non-international 
armed conflict.12 Moreover, as Stuxnet and other malware tools proliferate, 
it may be only a question of time before non-State actors will be able to 
carry out more sophisticated cyber operations. Against this backdrop, this 
article seeks to discuss particular legal issues arising under the laws of 
armed conflict with regard to the use of military cyber operations in non-
international armed conflicts. The analysis proceeds in three steps and will 
analyze three general questions. 
The first question that arises when considering the issue of cyber war-
fare in non-international armed conflicts is whether cyber operations in and 
of themselves, without accompanying kinetic military operations, could 
ever trigger a non-international armed conflict.13 In view of the relatively 
high threshold required for a non-international armed conflict, it appears 
this could happen only in the most exceptional cases. Nevertheless, States 
                                                                                                                      
9. See Syria Internet Services Shut Down as Protesters Fill Streets, WASHINGTON POST (June 
3, 2011, 9:58 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/syria-internet-
services-shut-down-as-protesters-fill-streets/2011/06/03/AGtLwxHH_blog.html. 
10. See US Drones Hacked by Iraqi Insurgents, GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2009, 3:02 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/17/skygrabber-american-drones-hacked. 
11. See David P. Fidler, Recent Developments and Revelations Concerning Cybersecurity and Cy-
berspace: Implications for International Law, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
INSIGHTS (June 20, 2012), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight120620.pdf; Hillary 
Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, Remarks at the Special Operations Command Gala Din-
ner (May 23, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/05/190805.htm; Benjamin 
Wittes, State Department Hackers?, LAWFARE (May 24, 2012, 7:08 AM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/state-department-hackers/. See, e.g., Hillary Clinton 
Boasts of US Cyberwar against Al-Qaeda, TELEGRAPH (May 24, 2012, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9286546/Hillary-Clinton-boasts-
of-US-cyberwar-against-al-Qaeda.html; Hacking Terrorist Websites Commonplace, THE INVES-
TIGATIVE PROJECT ON TERRORISM (June 3, 2011, 1:32 PM), 
http://www.investigativeproject.org/2937/hacking-terrorist-websitescommonplace; Ad-
am Rawnsley, Stop the Presses! Spooks Hacked al-Qaida Online Mag, WIRED (June 1, 2011, 1:56 
PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/stop-the-presses-spooks-hacked-al-
qaida-online-mag/. 
12. See Claus Kress, Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing Trans-
national Armed Conflicts, 15 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 245, 261, 266 
(2010). 
13. See Schmitt, supra note 3, at 368. 
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are concerned that sophisticated non-State actors could launch severe at-
tacks against modern States in which civil society, the economy and finan-
cial markets are increasingly reliant on a functioning, unimpeded cyber in-
frastructure.14 Indeed, while States have become much more aware of their 
cyber vulnerabilities—the Clinton administration issued a presidential di-
rective on critical infrastructure protection as early as in 199815—some 
technical experts maintain that significant vulnerabilities remain and that 
ultimately only disconnecting critical systems from networks could bring 
about a satisfactory degree of protection.16  
At this time, it is difficult to determine the significance of the cyber 
threat presented by non-State actors. Non-State actors committing cyber 
crime17 and economic cyber espionage18 do pose serious threats, but to date 
there have been no public reports of significant and highly devastating 
cyber attacks launched by non-State actors against a State. There is wide-
spread agreement among experts that cyber operations like Stuxnet and 
Flame, in view of their complexity and sophistication, could only have been 
carried out by a State, by a coalition of States or at least with significant 
State support.19 Therefore, on the yet-to-be-proven assumption that non-
State actors could wage highly destructive cyber operations upon States, 
                                                                                                                      
14. See Gable, supra note 5, at 73; Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment: Hearing 
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 111th Cong. 39 (2009) (statement of Dennis C. Blair, 
Director of National Intelligence), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/090212/ 
blair.pdf (“Terrorist groups, including al-Qai’da, HAMAS, and Hizballah, have expressed 
the desire to use cyber means to target the United States.”). 
15. The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presi-
dential Decision Directive 63, May 22, 1998, available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/ pdd-63.htm. 
16. SANDRO GAYCKEN, CYBERWAR—DAS WETTRÜSTEN HAT LÄNGST BEGONNEN 
235–36 (2012). 
17. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME: EXPLANATORY REPORT, 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/185.htm (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2012); Roderic Broadhurst, Developments in the Global Law Enforcement of Cyber-crime, 
29 POLICING: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICE STRATEGIES AND MANAGE-
MENT 415 (2006), available at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals. 
htm?articleid=1571786& show=abstract. 
18. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, FOR-
EIGN SPIES STEALING US ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE (2011), available at 
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_201
1.pdf. 
19. See Cyberattacks on Iran—Stuxnet and Flame, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug 9, 2012), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/computer_malware/st
uxnet/index.html. 
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this article will assess whether and under what circumstances such opera-
tions in and of themselves could trigger the application of the laws of 
armed conflict. 
The second question that arises when considering the issue of cyber 
warfare in non-international armed conflicts relates to the geographic scope 
of application of the laws of armed conflict. Cyberspace by definition 
transgresses all national boundaries. It defies any classic notion of a delim-
ited battlefield and enables parties to an armed conflict to launch cyber op-
erations from just about anywhere in the world, to target any network that 
is connected to cyberspace and to use components of the global cyber in-
frastructure (servers, cables, etc.) for military purposes. Therefore, it ap-
pears that the controversial debate over the geographic scope of applica-
tion of the laws of armed conflict pertaining to non-international armed 
conflicts is of particular relevance in the cyber domain. 
Finally, the third question relates to the use of cyber operations in the 
course of an already ongoing non-international armed conflict in which 
conventional kinetic military means and methods of warfare are being em-
ployed. It is now widely accepted that there is no legal vacuum in cyber-
space20 and that “[e]xisting principles of international law apply online, just 
as they do offline.”21 The critical question, however, is what particular legal 
challenges arise under the rules governing the conduct of hostilities in non-
international armed conflicts when means and methods of cyber warfare 
are employed?22 In order to answer these questions, it first needs to be de-
termined what kind of cyber operations are likely to be employed in non-
international armed conflicts before, in a second step, discussing the par-
ticular challenges arising under the laws of armed conflict.  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
20. No Legal Vacuum in Cyber Space, Interview with Cordula Droege, International 
Committee of the Red Cross (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/ doc-
uments/interview/2011/cyber-warfare-interview -2011-08-16.htm. 
21. Joe Biden, Vice President of the United States, Remarks at the London Confer-
ence on Cyberspace (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2011/11/01/vice-president-biden-delivers-remarks-london-conference-
cyberspace#transcript . 
22. Robin Geiss, The Legal Regulation of Cyber-attacks in Times of Armed Conflict, in 
BRUGES COLLOQUIUM, TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE HUMANITARIAN LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 47 (College of Europe & International Committee of the Red Cross eds., 
2011), available at http://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/page/collegium_ 
41_0.pdf. 
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II. CAN CYBER OPERATIONS BY THEMSELVES TRIGGER A  
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT? 
 
In order to determine whether cyber operations alone could bring into ex-
istence a non-international armed conflict, it needs to be assessed whether, 
and, if so, under what circumstances, the requisite threshold of violence 
and the degree of organization required with regard to the armed group 
involved is reached. 
 
A. The Intensity Requirement 
 
As is well known, in the Tadić judgment the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) affirmed that a non-international armed 
conflict exists only when there is “protracted armed violence.”23 This for-
mula has consistently been applied not only in the case law of the ICTY, 
but also by other tribunals, namely, the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.24 What is more, according 
to Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II and Article 8(2)(d) and (f) of the 
ICC Statute, as well as customary international law, situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, riots or sporadic acts of violence and other acts 
of a similar nature do not meet the required threshold of violence.25 In or-
der to facilitate the assessment of whether there is “protracted armed vio-
lence,” the ICTY considers various indicative criteria such as the gravity of 
attacks and their recurrence,26 the number of victims,27 the temporal and 
                                                                                                                      
23. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on the Defence Motion for In-
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadić ]; Vité, supra note 6.  
24. See ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CON-
FLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 121 nn.19–25 (2010). 
25. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Deci-
sion on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 225 (Pre-Trial Chamber II June 15, 2009; Anthony 
Cullen, The Definition of Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Threshold Contained in Article 8(2)(f), 12 JOURNAL OF CON-
FLICT AND SECURITY LAW 419, 429 (2007). 
26. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Trial Chamber Decision 
on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (Rule 98bis Decision), ¶ 28 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the 
former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Milošević]. 
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territorial expansion of violence28 and the collective character of hostili-
ties.29  
      Against this backdrop, it appears that no cyber attack has ever risen to 
the requisite threshold of violence. In terms of intensity, not even the 
Stuxnet operation, the only publicly known cyber operation (with the pos-
sible exception of the mysterious Siberian pipeline incident of 1982)30 that 
has directly caused physical destruction in the “real world,” approached the 
threshold of violence commonly required for a non-international armed 
conflict.31 What is more, even though ICTY trial chambers have interpreted 
the criterion of “protracted armed violence” as referring more to the inten-
sity of the armed violence than to its duration,32 it follows from the explicit 
caveat contained in Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II,33 which is also 
considered reflective of customary international law with regard to Com-
mon Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions,34 that singular and 
merely sporadic cyber incidents, including those that directly cause physical 
damage or injury, would not amount to a non-international armed conflict. 
Clearly, mere network intrusions, cyber exploitation operations, data theft 
and data manipulation, as well as random denial-of-service attacks carried 
out by a non-State actor, while they would fall into the realm of domestic 
                                                                                                                      
27. Id. 
28. Id., ¶ 29. 
29. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), ¶¶ 94–134, 
170 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, 
Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former 
Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008); see EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CON-
FLICTS 9–13 (2010). 
30. William Safire, The Farewell Dossier, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at A21, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/02/opinion/the-farewell-dossier.html. 
31. In fact, in the case of Stuxnet as far as can be seen no State—including Iran—has 
publicly qualified the incident as either an “armed attack” or an “armed conflict.” See, e.g., 
Gary Brown & Keira Poellet, The Customary International Law of Cyberspace, 6 STRATEGIC 
STUDIES QUARTERLY 132 (2012). 
32. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, supra note 29, ¶ 49. 
33. “This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as 
not being armed conflicts.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 
1(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. See also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PRO-
TOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 4471 
(Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). 
34. CULLEN, supra note 24, at 108; see SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 6, at 105. 
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criminal law35 and could arguably amount to “attacks” in the sense of Arti-
cle 49 of Additional Protocol I if carried out in the context of an already 
ongoing armed conflict,36 would not suffice to trigger a non-international 
armed conflict in view of the intensity threshold required for this particular 
armed conflict category. Therefore, while there may be some possibility 
that cyber operations by non-State actors in exceptional cases may reach 
the critical threshold of violence, it does not appear to be a likely scenario. 
 
B. The Required Degree of Organization 
 
In addition, for a non-international armed conflict to come into existence, 
a second criterion also needs to be fulfilled. As the ICTY has held, an 
armed conflict can exist only between parties that are sufficiently organized 
to confront each other with military means.37 While it has rightly been 
pointed out that the required degree of organization should not be exag-
gerated,38 in order to be sufficiently “organized” a non-State armed group 
must be under an established command structure and must have the capac-
ity to sustain military operations.39 In the Lubanga decision, the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber held that “the involvement of armed groups with some degree 
of organization and the ability to plan and carry out sustained military opera-
tions would allow for the conflict to be characterized as an armed conflict 
not of an international character.”40  
      The explicit reference to “some degree of organization” is indicative of 
the uncertainty as to the exact degree of organization required. In part, this 
is due to the fact that, notwithstanding universal agreement about the re-
quirement’s existence, it has never fully been clarified nor is there full 
agreement about the criterion’s precise function and purpose and why an 
armed group must be organized in the first place.41 Is it because only an 
organized armed group can be expected to sustain military operations on a 
level that meets the required intensity threshold? Or must an armed group 
                                                                                                                      
35. See GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME, supra note 4, at 203. 
36. See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE rule 30 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). 
37. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 23, ¶ 70. 
38. Claus Kress, The 1999 Crisis in East Timor and the Threshold of the Law on War Crimes, 
13 CRIMINAL LAW FORUM 409, 416 (2002). 
39. See Prosecutor v. Limaj, supra note 29, ¶ 129. 
40. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirma-
tion of Charges, ¶ 233 (Pre-Trial Chamber I Jan. 29, 2007) (emphasis added). 
41. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 36, cmt. to rule 23, ¶ 15. 
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be organized because only then can it be expected to ensure that its mem-
bers abide by the laws of armed conflict?42 The 2008 Report of the Interna-
tional Law Association’s Use of Force Committee seems to support the 
former reading. It suggests that “[t]he criteria of organization and intensity 
are clearly related and should be considered together when assessing 
whether a particular situation amounts to an armed conflict. It seems that 
the higher the level of organization the less degree of intensity may be re-
quired and vice versa.”43 This assessment, of course, also leaves open the 
questions of the required minimum degree, if any, of organization and 
whether high intensity operations of only loosely organized or even unor-
ganized actors could suffice. 
Of course, it is beyond any doubt that armed groups like the Taliban 
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the FARC) meet the 
requisite degree of organization. If distinct armed groups with a similarly 
high degree of organization launched cyber operations that reach the re-
quired intensity threshold, a non-international armed conflict would be 
triggered. At the same time, however, it is equally clear that cyber opera-
tions and computer network attacks by private individuals would not suf-
fice. Such actions may invoke domestic criminal law, but not the laws of 
armed conflict. Even when a number of individual actors are acting collec-
tively—for example in a spontaneous denial-of-service attack that finds 
more and more online followers or by sharing and spreading malware 
tools—they do not qualify as an organized armed group. Collective ac-
tion—or even organized action—without more is neither sufficient nor 
decisive.  
What matters is the existence of a distinct armed group and that that 
particular group has a visible and verifiable organizational structure.44 Thus, 
the ICTY, when assessing the organizational structure of the Kosovo Lib-
eration Army, referred, inter alia, to factors such as the existence of military 
headquarters,45 the adoption of internal regulations,46 the nomination of a 
                                                                                                                      
42. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 33, ¶ 4470 (regard-
ing Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II); see also TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 36, cmt. 
to rule 23, ¶ 14 n.202. 
43. Committee on the Use of Force, International Law Association, Initial Report on 
the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law 22 (2008) [hereinafter Meaning of 
Armed Conflict]; see Vité, supra note 6, at 76. 
44. See Prosecutor v. Limaj, supra note 29, ¶¶ 89–90. 
45. Id., ¶ 90; Prosecutor v. Milošević, supra note 26, ¶¶ 23–24. 
46. See Prosecutor v. Limaj, supra note 29, ¶¶ 98, 113–17. 
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spokesperson,47 and the issuance of orders, political statements and com-
muniqués,48 as well as the establishment of military police and disciplinary 
rules.49 Similarly, in the Callixte Mbarushimana decision the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber referred, inter alia, to the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda’s (FDLR’s) hierarchical structure and high level of internal organi-
zation, the existence of a political and a military wing, and the FDLR’s con-
stitutive instruments, which included “a statute, a ‘règlement d’ordre intérieur’ 
and a disciplinary code which provided the organization’s internal discipli-
nary system.”50 
More recently, there have been discussions about whether so-called 
“virtual groups,” i.e., groups that are organized exclusively on-line and con-
sist of people dispersed over various locations, could be qualified as orga-
nized armed groups.51 Setting aside the controversial question of interna-
tional humanitarian law’s geographic scope of application, it appears that 
merely virtual groupings that have no physical infrastructure, such as head-
quarters, physical meeting points, etc., would be too elusive to qualify as a 
reference point for the determination of the existence of a non-
international armed conflict. What is more, due to the notorious human-
machine gap in cyberspace, that is, the problem of identifying the natural 
person behind a given computer, it would be almost impossible to deter-
mine membership in a virtual group with any degree of certainty. Of 
course, over time using extensive forensic investigations and the means and 
methods of law enforcement such a determination may be possible, but 
within the narrow time frame that is typically available in a conduct of hos-
tilities context it seems unrealistic.  
Moreover, it appears that the different criteria referred to in the Limaj 
judgment and the Callixte Mbarushimana decision—albeit only non-exclusive 
and  indicative—inherently presuppose a certain degree of effective control 
exercised through a chain of command of the group concerned. And, alt-
hough it may be possible to issue orders online irrespective of geographic 
distance between the members of a virtual group, the means to enforce 
such orders are significantly limited when the connection between the 
                                                                                                                      
47. Id., ¶¶ 99, 102. 
48. Id., ¶ 101. 
49. Id., ¶ 113. 
50. Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Con-
firmation of Charges, ¶ 104 (Pre-Trial Chamber I Dec. 16, 2011). 
51. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 36, cmt. to rule 23, ¶ 13 (a virtual organization is 
one “in which all activities that bear on the criterion [organization] occur on-line”). 
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members of the group is only virtual. Therefore, the idea that a decentral-
ized virtual group of persons in different locations—possibly dispersed all 
over the globe—could constitute an organized armed group in the sense of 
the laws of armed conflict should be dismissed. While it is undeniable that 
genuine and important security interests of States may be affected by the 
activities of such virtual groups, the laws of armed conflict hardly serve as a 
panacea to solve cyber security issues on a global level. 
 
III. THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE LAWS OF  
ARMED CONFLICT IN THE CYBER CONTEXT 
  
Cyberspace is a decentralized, global medium that transgresses national 
boundaries and defies any notion of a delimited battlefield.52 The fact that 
cyber attacks can be launched from anywhere in the world with launch-to-
impact times being reduced to milliseconds53 certainly adds to the contro-
versy regarding the geographic scope of application of the laws of armed 
conflict in non-international armed conflicts.54 Is a Taliban fighter who 
launches a cyber attack from Islamabad, Pakistan against International Se-
curity Assistance Force (ISAF) member States still subject to the laws of 
armed conflict and thereby a legitimate military target? Is the individual 
hacker who operates out of Buenos Aires and launches cyber attacks 
against ISAF’s communication infrastructure in Afghanistan thereby ren-
dered a legitimate military target? Or is he only a criminal hacker subject to 
domestic law enforcement in Argentina? 
It is not the purpose of this article to revisit or engage in a detailed re-
view of this familiar debate that has been laid out extensively elsewhere.55 
In any case, as far as military operations against persons are concerned, the 
legal questions that arise in the cyber context are no different from those 
that arise with regard to the highly controversial practice of extraterritorial 
targeted killings. Suffice it to say, a number of authors agree that the notion 
of non-international armed conflict as set forth in Common Article 3 is not 
confined to single-State scenarios, but also comprises a certain cross-
                                                                                                                      
52. See DINNISS, supra note 2. 
53. Robin Geiss, War and Law in Cyberspace: The Conduct of Hostilities in and via Cyber-
space, 104 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 371 (2011). 
54. See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 6, at 250–52 nn.102–20. 
55. See, e.g., Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2003); MARCO SASSÒLI, TRANSNATIONAL ARMED GROUPS AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2006); Kress, supra note 12. 
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border dimension.56 Opinions vary, however, on whether this cross-border 
dimension is regionally confined to so-called “spill-over scenarios”57 or 
whether it may warrant a wider, arguably even global, application of the 
laws of armed conflict.58 The wording of Common Article 3 is sufficiently 
broad to accommodate a cross-border dimension, and in the case of spillo-
ver conflicts, where national boundaries are randomly and frequently 
crossed, pragmatic reasons and the geographic proximity to the original 
armed conflict may support such an interpretation.59 Nevertheless, the var-
ious definitions of non-international armed conflict as they are laid out in 
treaty law, whether in Common Article 3, Article 1(1) of Additional Proto-
col II or Article 8(2)(f) of the ICC Statute, and the ICTY’s ruling in Tadić, 
all contain a territorial link of some sort.60 Against this background, and in 
light of the fact that the laws of non-international armed conflicts consti-
tute a reaction to extreme levels of military violence (hence the high 
threshold requirements laid out above),61 multi-State application that pays 
no heed to the geographical proximity to ongoing hostilities cannot, in the 
view of the present author, be sustained.62 
Cyber warfare, by virtue of the technological nature of cyberspace, adds 
an additional aspect to the debate. Every cyber operation carried out via 
the Internet (except where malware is implanted directly into the target sys-
tem as was the case with Stuxnet) typically uses cyber infrastructure com-
ponents in different locations around the globe. Therefore, in the case of 
cyber warfare, the issue of geographic scope of application of the laws of 
                                                                                                                      
56. Milanovic & Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra note 6; NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL 
USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 101–4 (2010); Dapo Akande, Classification of 
Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION 
OF CONFLICTS 32, 46–47 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012). 
57. Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More Than Meets the Eye, 93 IN-
TERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 189 (2011). 
58. GEOFFREY S. CORN, VICTOR M. HANSEN, DICK JACKSON, ERIC TALBOT JENSEN 
& JAMES A. SCHOETTLER JR., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILI-
TARY PERSPECTIVE 11 (2009) 
59. Pejic, supra note 59, at 193. 
60. The ICC Chamber in the Bemba Gombo decision therefore concluded that an 
armed conflict not of an international character “takes place within the confines of a State 
territory.” Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, supra note 25, ¶ 231. 
61. See supra notes 23–36 and accompanying text. 
62. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 56 (2d ed. 2010) (“from the vantage point of interna-
tional law . . . a non-international armed conflict cannot possibly assume global dimen-
sions”). 
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armed conflict is as relevant to the targeting of objects involved in cyber 
operations as it currently is with regard to persons.  
Certainly, in an international armed conflict involving highly sophisti-
cated military forces and large-scale cyber operations, a vast percentage of 
the worldwide civilian and dual-use cyber infrastructure will be used for 
military purposes, potentially posing a considerable challenge to the law of 
neutrality. But the trans-boundary nature of cyberspace and the dual-use 
character of the global cyber infrastructure may also play out in non-
international armed conflicts. The following, admittedly rather simplistic, 
example may help to illustrate the point. Taliban fighters install a botnet—a 
worldwide network of remote-controlled civilian computers63—in order to 
generate computer power to launch a cyber operation against the commu-
nication infrastructure of States supporting the Afghan government in its 
fight against the Taliban. All the civilian systems unknowingly involved in 
the botnet are used to make an effective contribution—however individu-
ally minimal—to military action. Collectively they are the infrastructure 
used to carry out a cyber operation and thus would arguably qualify as legit-
imate military objects in accordance with the definition contained in Article 
52 of Additional Protocol I, which is generally accepted as being reflective 
of customary international law in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts.64 
Of course, it could be argued that even when certain components of 
the global cyber infrastructure are used for military purposes, this does not 
automatically render them a military objective because in the interconnect-
ed and largely resilient domain of cyberspace destroying or temporarily dis-
rupting a server that is used for military purposes by non-State actors 
would not offer a definite military advantage since the cyber operation can 
be easily switched to other servers. Under these circumstances, destroying 
or disrupting individual components would not diminish the attacker’s ca-
pacity to execute further cyber operations. After all, Article 52(2) and the 
corresponding customary law rule contain a two-pronged test. In order to 
qualify as a legitimate military objective, an object must not only be used to 
make an effective contribution to military action, but its destruction must 
                                                                                                                      
63. An example is the Mariposa botnet, which reportedly involved an estimated 13 
million systems in over 190 countries. See Joseph Menn, Investigators Shut Down Mariposa 
Hacking Network, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, World News, at 7. 
64. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW rule 8, at 29 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). 
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also offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the 
time.65  
It appears doubtful, however, that Article 52(2)’s military advantage re-
quirement will function as an effective constraint. Although the law clearly 
requires a two-pronged test when qualifying military objectives, the inter-
play of these two tests has remained ambiguous.  In practice, the emphasis 
is usually placed only on the first. As the commentary in the Air and Missile 
Warfare Manual confirms, “[i]n practical terms, compliance with the first 
criterion [the requirement of nature, location, purpose or use] will generally 
result in the advantage required of the second.”66 
It must be noted that only if there is an assumption of a multi-State or 
global application of the laws of non-international armed conflicts can the 
use of the worldwide cyber infrastructure for military purposes by non-
State actors potentially render its components military objectives. Article 52 
and the customary law definition of legitimate military objectives are only 
of relevance when the laws of armed conflict apply in the first place. In 
traditional non-international armed conflicts, the use of State or civilian 
property by organized armed groups undisputedly rendered these objects 
legitimate military objectives. The problem is that cyberspace has enabled 
States and non-State actors to use State and civilian cyber infrastructure 
components located in countries around the world.  
Yet it is far from clear that this justifies an automatic extension of the 
scope of application of the laws of armed conflict. In essence, this would 
allow non-State actors to turn components of the worldwide cyber infra-
structure into legitimate military objectives basically by virtue of a few 
mouse clicks. Within milliseconds during a single cyber attack various data 
packages may randomly travel via different channels all over the world, 
thereby arguably using all of these channels to make an effective contribu-
tion to military action.  A global application of the laws of armed conflict 
that encompasses any militarily useful cyber activity wherever it may occur 
would rapidly lead to a large-scale militarization of cyberspace and could 
obviously have far-reaching destabilizing effects on relations between 
States.  
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Absent a specific legal regime of neutrality relating to non-international 
armed conflicts,67 ius ad bellum rules constrain military operations against 
cyber infrastructure in third States even if components of this infrastruc-
ture qualify as legitimate military objectives. However, if military operations 
are regarded as permissible in cases where States are unable due to lack of 
expertise or technology to stop physical cyber infrastructure located on 
their territory from being used to carry out cyber operations against other 
States,68 ius ad bellum rules may not impose a significant constraint in the 
cyber context. Currently, even States with the most advanced cyber tech-
nology are often unable to detect and immediately end malicious cyber ac-
tivity that occurs on, or originates from, their territory, let alone attribute 
such operations to individual persons. 
  
IV. CYBER OPERATIONS AS A METHOD OF WARFARE IN NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN WHICH THERE  
ARE TRADITIONAL KINETIC MILITARY OPERATIONS 
 
While there is little doubt that military cyber operations will become in-
creasingly relevant in future non-international armed conflicts, currently the 
focus of military strategists is principally on inter-State scenarios and inter-
national armed conflicts.69 This is reflected in contemporary legal literature 
on cyber warfare, which has largely focused on the laws of armed conflict 
as they apply in international armed conflicts.70 In future inter-State armed 
conflicts that involve high-tech belligerents with sophisticated cyber capa-
bilities and corresponding vulnerabilities, gaining information domi-
nance—i.e., control over cyberspace and outer space—will become as im-
portant a strategic goal as obtaining control over territory, airspace or the 
                                                                                                                      
67. The law of neutrality applies only during international armed conflicts. See TAL-
LINN MANUAL, supra note 36, ch. VII, ¶ 1. 
68. Id., cmt. to rule 13, ¶ 22. The “unable and unwilling” standard, however, remains 
controversial. See TOM RUYS, ARMED ATTACK AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER—
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE (2010). 
69. See, e.g., Secretary of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 
21st Century Defense (2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense 
_Strategic _Guidance.pdf. 
70. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 3; Watts, supra note 3; Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber War-
fare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks, 88 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1533, 1542 (2010); 
KNUT DÖRMANN, APPLICABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO COMPUTER 
NETWORK ATTACKS (2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ ap-
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sea has been in traditional conflicts.71 As the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Re-
view Report emphasizes, “in the 21st century, modern armed forces simply 
cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without resilient, reliable 
information and communication networks and assured access to cyber-
space.”72 
Military cyber operations in future inter-State armed conflicts will aim 
to degrade the enemy’s capacity to use cyberspace for military operations, 
to manipulate the enemy’s data and the functioning of its cyber-connected 
systems, and to block the enemy’s ability to communicate via cyberspace. It 
is well known that sophisticated military forces of major States are already 
preparing for potential future cyber battlefields by preimplanting concealed 
codes and software tools in various strategically relevant “places,” as well as 
by manipulating hardware components along the supply chain.73 This type 
of cyber warfare will not only use cyberspace as a medium to deliver at-
tacks against “real world” military targets (e.g., launching a cyber attack 
against an electrical power plant that is used for military purposes), but will 
also include large-scale kinetic military operations against strategically rele-
vant cyber infrastructure components, including software and hardware, all 
over the globe. 
Cyber warfare in non-international armed conflicts will likely feature 
only some of these aspects of cyber war between States. While fears have 
been expressed that non-State actors could use cyber operations to en-
hance their military capabilities and to attack critical infrastructure of 
States, it is not clear that non-State actors currently have that capacity. Yet, 
the cyber vulnerabilities of organized armed groups against which cyber 
attacks could be conducted also remain limited. Even though some of the 
States currently involved in the non-international armed conflict in Afghan-
istan are heavily reliant on cyber capabilities for their military operations in 
Afghanistan,74 the Taliban do not appear to have the technological ability 
to attack these capabilities or even interfere with them to any significant 
                                                                                                                      
71. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 37. 
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73. See BRYAN KREKEL, PATTON ADAMS & GEORGE BAKOS, NORTHRUP GRUMMAN 
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degree. Conversely, the reliance of the Taliban on cyber assets or systems 
connected to cyberspace to carry out military operations or attacks—apart 
perhaps from the use of mobile telephones for military communications 
and the remote detonation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)75—also 
appears to be limited. 
Of course, the situation may be different if third States become in-
volved in a non-international armed conflict. Thus, in the currently hypo-
thetical scenario of an intervention by third States in the ongoing non-
international armed conflict in Syria, it is certainly conceivable that cyber 
operations would be used to disable Syrian air defense systems. Needless to 
say, however, that intervention of external States would lead to an interna-
tional armed conflict between the intervening States and Syria, in addition 
to the already ongoing non-international armed conflict.  
In traditional non-international armed conflicts, i.e., those in which 
other States do not intervene, it seems that cyber warfare in the strict sense 
of the actual conduct of hostilities is today of only rather limited relevance. 
Rather, cyberspace is used for vastly different purposes, namely, using so-
cial media and media reporting for public information purposes and politi-
cal mobilization. Even though it is likely that with the rapidly growing 
worldwide dependence on cyberspace, further technological evolution and 
the proliferation of malware tools, the relevance of cyberspace will increase 
in non-international armed conflicts, the legal questions that arise in rela-
tion to the conduct of hostilities in such conflicts are generally similar to 
those arising in international armed conflicts. 
Thus, when cyberspace is used as a medium to deliver attacks against 
“real world” targets, as opposed to “virtual targets,” typically no particular 
legal challenges will arise. Whether a legitimate military objective, such as a 
military communications center, is attacked via cyberspace or by an air-
strike, the same legal principles apply.76 Clearly, any attacker planning to 
carry out such an attack would be bound, inter alia, by the principle of pro-
                                                                                                                      
75. Mobile telephones are often a vital military instrument for organized armed 
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military movements and operations. 
76. See Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 67. The precautions in attack norm is codified in 
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I for international armed conflict, whereas the rule of 
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portionality and would be required to take precautions in accordance with 
customary international law.77  
Moreover, as in international armed conflicts, it may be questionable 
whether a particular operation qualifies as an “attack” in the legal sense of 
Article 49 of Additional Protocol I, which, by virtue of customary interna-
tional law, also applies to non-international armed conflicts.78 It appears, 
however, that various aspects of this debate have now been settled by the 
definition in the Tallinn Manual, according to which “[a] cyber attack is a 
cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably ex-
pected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to ob-
jects,” which by and large appears to reflect widespread consensus.79  
Controversy persists only with regard to the question of whether dam-
age and destruction also encompass the temporary loss of functionality in 
cases where no direct physical damage results.80 For example, computerized 
systems may be manipulated via cyberspace in order to shut down con-
nected systems. Thus, the distribution of electrical energy could be stopped 
by virtue of data manipulation in the control systems of power grids and 
power plants with no direct physical destruction. Such operations may be 
strategically appealing, particularly in non-international armed conflicts 
where States will aim to deprive their non-State enemies of strategic assets 
such as electrical power, while leaving the underlying infrastructure intact. 
It is clear that not every military operation that causes inconvenience for 
the civilian population—for example, a roadblock—automatically qualifies 
as an attack in the legal sense.81 It is also clear that collective punishments 
and the terrorization of the civilian population are strictly prohibited under 
all circumstances.82 Nevertheless, there is nothing in the laws of armed con-
flict that would bar an interpretation that qualifies an operation leading to 
the loss of functionality—irrespective of how this loss is caused and 
whether this involved physical destruction—as an attack. In fact, the over-
all object and purpose of the rules governing the conduct of hostilities—
“to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
                                                                                                                      
77. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 64, rules 15–21, 
at 51–67. 
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objects”83—would generally seem to militate in favor of a broader, rather 
than a more limited, understanding of the notion of attack, given that only 
attacks in the legal sense are subject to the principle of distinction and pro-
portionality. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
At present, many of the issues pertaining to non-international armed con-
flicts and cyber warfare remain the subject of some speculation. In particu-
lar, the military cyber capabilities that non-State actors currently have, or 
may develop, is unclear. Though it appears highly unlikely that cyber at-
tacks by a non-State actor could alone trigger a non-international armed 
conflict, specific cyber attacks in the course of an ongoing conflict in which 
traditional kinetic forms of attack are occurring are certainly conceivable. 
As far as legal issues pertaining to the actual conduct of hostilities are con-
cerned, the legal questions raised are generally the same as those that are 
currently being discussed with regard to international armed conflicts. 
There is widespread agreement that cyberspace is not a legal vacuum and 
that international law, including the laws of armed conflict, applies in cy-
berspace. But in view of the dual-use nature of the entire cyber infrastruc-
ture and the fact that the artificial domain of cyberspace transgresses State 
boundaries, it seems that an unrestrained application of the laws of armed 
conflict, especially those relating to non-international armed conflicts, 
could lead to an unwarranted large-scale militarization of cyberspace. Quite 
clearly, therefore, the laws pertaining to non-international armed conflicts 
should be applied cautiously in the cyber domain and, in view of the unique 
and still insufficiently understood technical features of cyberspace and the 
possibilities for its military use, the precise parameters of their application 
need to be worked out more concretely than they have been to date. 
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1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, 
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